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Summary  findings
Recent experience with fiscal decentralization in many  Among topics that deserve further research attention:
developing and transition economies has led many  *  The interplay between intergovernmental  grants and
observers to question whether fiscal decentralization  government borrowing.
undermines macroeconomic stability.  - What is the difference in effect on lower-level
In several countries, transfers from central to lower-  governments between "hard" and "soft" budget
level governments have increased fiscal deficits at the  constraints? What economic distortions are associated
central level, creating pressures on central banks to  with soft budget constraints? What institutional reforms
monetize additional debt, thus jeopardizing price  might help to establish hard budget constraints?
stability. In other countries, central governments trying  Is the "country" still the appropriate unit of analysis
to control their deficits have reduced transfers to lower-  for important economic issues? What economic benefits
level governments, creating fiscal distress at lower levels.  or costs result from including several regions within one
These issues of macroeconomic fiscal stability have not  jurisdictional structure? What economic considerations
featured prominently in North  American policy debates  deterrmine  the optimal size of a "country" and what are
about fiscal federalism, nor has much academic research  the crucial economic functions of "national"
been devoted to them. In a world where the state's basic  governments?
political organization is undergoing rapid reform and  *  Demographic change, changes in communication
restructuring, the tensions and opportunities created by  and transportation technology, and the development of
fiscal interactions among levels of government are of  market institutions may alter the optimal or equilibrium
critical concern.  boundaries of political units over time. Such change
Much of the literature on fiscal federalism has been  invariably raises questions about the organization of the
geared to the situation in such industrial countries as  public sector and the assignment of expenditures and
Canada and the United States. Policymakers and  revenues to different levels of government. The patterns
researchers should identify the institutional structures of  of gains and losses from reorganizing factor markets and
stable, mature federations that help sustain satisfactory  jurisdictional structures can be complex. To understand
macroeconomic performance. But different policy  them fully requires understanding the economic
problems are likely to arise in different settings,  consequences of changes in both market organization
especially in the developing world.  and policy outcomes resulting from reorganization of the
public sector.
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I. Introduction
There  has been  a  resurgence  of interest,  in many  parts  of the  world,  in  problems  of
multi-level  government  finance.  Recent  and  ongoing  political  and  economic developments
raise  questions  about  the  role of the  nation,  subnational  governments,  and  supranational
public  authorities  in  the  provision  and  financing  of public-sector  programs.  This  paper
provides  a  selective  review  of  policy  issues  and  recent  trends  in  a  number  of different
countries  and  regions.
Problems  of fiscal centralization  and  decentralization  by  their  nature  tend  to  have
important  political  and  institutional  dimensions  that  vary  from  one country  or region to
another.  Shifting  the  locus  of fiscal responsibility  among  levels of government  may occur
relatively  incrementally,  as in stable  federations  like the  US, or they may  occur with  dra-
matic speed,  as in the disintegration  of the Soviet Union or the unification  of Germany.  In
all cases,  however,  there  are specific historical  and  institutional  factors  that  channel  the
process  of fiscal adjustment  within  the  broader  context  of overall economic  and  political
change.  Widely  varying  political  and  economic systems,  levels of economic development,
and  legal, constitutional,  and  fiscal traditions  form  the  milieu within  which  the  responsi-
bilities of different  levels of government  are determined.  If it is difficult to  appreciate  fully
the importance  and  interactions  of all of these factors  for any single country,  it is probably
impossible  to  do so for many  countries  taken  together.  Yet,  precisely  because  each coun-
try's  fiscal institutions  are dependent  on local  circumstances,  analysts  and  policymakers
can  potentially  benefit  greatly  from  the  broader  perspective  that  can  be  obtained  from
study  of the  problems  of intergovernmental  fiscal relations  encountered  in other  countries
and  regions.  The  institutions  of fiscal federalism  vary  widely  across the  world,  and  it is
worthwhile  trying  to  cull  what  insights  we can  from  observation  and  comparison  of the
divergent  experiences  of different  countries.1
The  present  paper  attempts,  within  a short  space,  to  highlight  a few of the  issues of
fiscal federalism,  intergovernmental  fiscal relations,  and  fiscal decentralization  that  have
emerged  throughout  the  world  in recent  years.  Section  II  discusses the  developed  coun-
tries of Western  Europe  and  North America,  regions  in which basic economic and  political
1institutions  are relatively  stable  and policy changes occur in a comparatively  orderly fash-
ion.  This  section  draws  attention  to some  of the important  fiscal dimensions  of economic
integration  in the EU  and  to  some of the  longstanding  tensions  in  the mature  federations
of the US and Canada.  Section III examines  the problems of fiscal federalism  in several im-
portant  developing  and  "transition"  countries.  Here the institutional  background  is much
less settled,  and  the  pressing  problems  of fiscal structure  take  on  a  somewhat  different
character.  A survey of recent  developments  in India, China,  Brazil,  Argentina,  and Russia
shows that  the  public  finances  of central  and  subnational  governments  in  each  of these
important  countries  have undergone  significant  changes in recent  years  and  that  the ongo-
ing evolution  of the fiscal institutions  and  responsibilities  of different  levels of government
will play a major  role in the  economic and political  development  of these  countries  in the
coming decades.  Based on the discussion  of Sections II  and III,  Section  IV identifies some
possible  topics for future  research.
II.  Fiscal  Federalism:  European  and  North  ALmerican Perspectives
The European  Union.  In Western  Europe,  the process  of economic integration  among
the countries of the European  Union raises numerous  questions  of fiscal coordination  among
member  states.  The  taxation  of multi-national  enterprises  and  the  administration  of na-
tional  value-added  taxes  in an EU free of fiscal frontiers  present  immediate  practical  prob-
lems  (see,  e.g.,  Fehr  et  al.  [1995] and  Tanzi  [1995], and  references  therein,  for  recent
discussions  of VAT taxation  and  the  taxation  of corporations  and  capital  returns  in  a
multi-national  setting).  Furthermore,  as labor  and  capital  markets  within  the  EU  (and
between  EU and  non-EU  countries)  become  increasingly  integrated,  fiscal externalities  as-
sociated  with  national-level  redistributive  policies  are  likely  to  become  more  important.
Oates  (1968) and  others  have argued  that  the  redistributive  functions  of the  public  sec-
tor  are not  within  the proper  sphere  of responsibilities  of "lower-level" governments,  that
is, governments  that  are  open  with  respect  to  the  markets  for labor  and  capital.  Tradi-
tionally, the  "central"  government  to  which  redistributive  functions  would  be assigned  is
conceived to be  a national  government.  When  factors  of production  become  increasingly
mobile across international  boundaries,  however, the  government  of a single country  is no
longer a  "central"  government  in the relevant  sense.  One must  therefore  ask whether  the
extensive  national-level  redistributive  programs  that  have developed  over the course of the
present  century  in  the  EU  (and  elsewhere)  will remain  viable  over time.  If it  is possible
to perpetuate  them,  will it be desirable  to do so?  Does multinational  policy coordination,
perhaps  through  the  further  development  of EU-level institutions,  provide an  appropriate
2mechanism  through  which  redistributive  and  other  fiscal policies  can be organized?2
Although  the  financing  of agricultural  subsidies  has  presented  major  and  at  times
almost  crippling  challenges  to  the EU, EU regional  development  and  social fund expendi-
tures  have increased  over time.  At least  until  recently, it was not  difficult to  imagine that
still  more  policies  of this  type  might  be  shifted  to  the  supranational  level  in the  longer
term.  The  Single Market,  the  Maastricht  Treaty,  the  expansion  of EU  membership  to in-
clude Austria,  Finland,  and  Sweden (and  the prospective  accession of some of the  rapidly
reforming  countries  of eastern  Europe)  seemed to  exemplify a powerful  momentum  in fa-
vor of European  policy  integration.  However, attainment  of the  Maastricht  timetable  for
harmonization  of monetary  and  fiscal policies now seems to  be very  unlikely for most  EU
member  states.  Notably,  it appears  that  the  most  stubborn  obstacles  to  monetary  union,
at least as envisaged  in the  Maastricht  treaty,  arise from the  difficulties that  countries  will
face in meeting the  fiscal convergence criteria,  particularly  those  restricting  the size of gov-
ernment  deficits  and  debt-to-GDP  ratios.  For instance,  the requirement  that  the national
debt  should  not  exceed  60% of GDP  is certainly  out  of reach  for countries  like Belgium
(the  seat  of many  EU  institutions)  and  Italy  (one of the  large  EU  countries,  along with
Germany, France,  and  the  UK),  countries  whose current  debt/GDP  ratios  exceed  100%.
Failure to meet  the specific fiscal convergence criteria  set out  in the Maastricht  Treaty
would not  appear,  however, to present  any fundamental  obstacle  to monetary  union.  The
criteria,  after  all, are somewhat  arbitrary,  and  it is intrinsically  problematic  to tie  a qual-
itative  event  - a country's  accession to  a  monetary  union  - to  a  quantitative  economic
indicator.  If the  debt/GDP  ratio  matters  at  all  for  monetary  stability,  it  matters  in  a
quantitative  way, and  there  is no  economically-meaningful  critical  value around  which  a
country's  accession to a monetary  union  will have qualitatively  divergent  impacts.  Indeed.
it  is interesting  to  note  in  this  context  that  Belgium,  with  one  of the  highest  debt/GDP
rations  in the EU, has long had  an effective monetary  union with  Luxembourg,  which has
one  of the  lowest.  "Flexible"  interpretation  of the  fiscal criteria  may well allow EMU  to
proceed  in  any  case  (as  discussed,  e.g.,  in Artis  [1996]).  The  important  lesson  to  draw
frorn this  experience  is probably  not  that  monetary  union  is hard  to  achieve but  rather
that  individual  EU  countries  find it extremely  difficult to  impose restraints  on social and
redistributive  policies for the sake of meeting obligations  to other  EU member  states.  The
problems  of monetary  union  a  la Maastricht,  in other  words,  cast  doubt  on the  feasibil-
ity  (and  perhaps  the  desirability)  of harmonization  of fiscal policies  and  the  social  and
distributional  objectives  that  they  embody.
3Even while the  proper  role of EU-level fiscal institutions  is debated,  the organization
of fiscal affairs within  EU  member  states  is undergoing  substantial  change.  Efforts  have
been  underway  in  France,  Italy,  and  Spain  to  decentralize  political  and  fiscal authority
(Gerard-Varet  [1994], Owens and Panella  [1991], Goodspeed  [1994]). The internal  economic
integration  accompanying  German  unification,  including  particularly  freedom of labor and
capital  mobility  within  the  national  market,  has  required  a  strong  central  government
response  due  to  the  uneven  levels of development  between  East  and  West coupled with  a
commitment  to  uniform  fiscal treatment  under  generous  programs  of social benefits  (see
Sinn and Sinn  (1992) for further  discussion).  The structure  of local government  finance in
the  United  Kingdom,  and  in particular  the  attempt  to  reduce  local  reliance on property
taxes  by shifting  to  poll taxes  has been the  subject  of vigorous  controversy  (Besley et al.
[forthcoming]).
Canada.  While  issues of fiscal centralization  and  decentralization  are attracting  new
attention  in the EU, they have been of enduring  concern  in established  federations  such as
the US and Canada. 3 Equalization  of fiscal status  has been a longstanding  goal of Canada's
very substantial  programs  of grants  from the  national  to  the provincial  governments,  and
the need to understand  better  the equity and efficiency implications  of these programs  has
stimulated  a steady  stream  of research  on the  economics  of intergovernmental  transfers.4
Of course,  the  separatist  movement  in Quebec  heightens  sensitivity  to  intergovernmental
fiscal relations  in  Canada  and  may yet result  in a fundamental  political  restructuring,  or
even disintegration,  of the  Canadian  federation,  changes  which  would  likely necessitate
profound  fiscal restructuring  as  well.  The  disposition  of national  liabilities  and  assets
(e.g.,  the  national  debt,  the  public  pension  system,  public  lands  and  corporations)  and
the  coordination  of health  and  social welfare policies among  the  provinces  would present
serious challenges to  policymakers  in a politically  and  fiscally fragmented  Canada.5
The  United  States.  In the  US, shifts  in the  balance  of fiscal  authority  between  the
Federal,  state,  and  local  governments  tend  to  mirror  basic  changes  in  domestic  policy.
The  period  since the  1930s has  witnessed  substantial  growth  in  Federal  government  in-
volvement  in  redistributive  policies  including  public  pensions  and  transfers  to  the  poor.
While  the  Federal  government  plays  a major  role, independently  of states  and  localities,
in  the  provision  of retirement  income  and  health  care  for  the  elderly,  much  of its  par-
ticipation  in other  redistributive  programs,  especially  those  aimed  at  providing cash  and
health  benefits  for the  poor  (AFDC  and  Medicaid)  has taken  the form of matching grants
to  state  governments.  These  transfers  have been  accompanied  by significant  restrictions
4on the  form  and  administration  of the  programs  they  support,  contributing  to  calls for
"fundamental"  reforms  that  would convert  Federal  support  to lump-sum  assistance  to  the
states  with  minimal  restrictions  on their  use.  Since Federal  matching  rates  lower the cost
to  state  governments  of assisting  the  poor  by 50% or  more,  such  reforms  could result  in
significant  reductions  in total  redistributive  spending.  On  the  other  hand,  it is possible
that  decentralization  of redistributive  programs  would result  in greater  program  effective-
ness, for example through  better  targeting  of benefits,  gains in administrative  efficiency, or
basic program  redesign.  There  is certainly  considerable  dissatisfaction  with  the apparent
inability  of existing  welfare programs  to  achieve significant  progress  in poverty  eradica-
tion, and  it is possible  that  the diversity  of policies that  would likely emerge  from a more
decentralized  policy regime  may uncover useful information  about  how to  improve policy
design and  implementation.
The division of fiscal responsibilities  between state  and local governments has also been
the subject  of continuing  reassessment  in the US. The provision  of primary  and  secondary
education  has  been  a  principal  function  of local  governments  in  the  US throughout  the
present  century.  and  the  persistence  of significant  variations  in  levels of provision  among
localities testifies  to substantial  differences in demand  for education  within the population.
A large  fraction  of the  US population  lives in metropolitan  areas which contain  dozens  of
individual  localities  within  commuting  distance  of core cities,  so that  households  can  ob-
tain  quite  diverse  levels of public  education  provision  through  their  residential  choices. 6
Since education  is an  important  determinant  of lifetime  well-being,  however, equity  con-
siderations  can conflict  with  the  unequal  provision  of education  that  allocative  efficiency
would require.7 Indeed,  courts  in many  states  have held  that  inequalities  in the  level of
fiscal resources  available  to  different  localities  for  the  finance  of education  violate  state
(though  not  Federal)  constitutional  requirements  for equal  protection  or  treatment  (see,
e.g.,  Inman  and  Rubinfeld  [1979]).  It  is one  thing  to  declare  a system  of finance  to  be
inequitable,  however,  and  something  else again  to  find  remedies  that  both  effective and
efficient.  As  discussed  by Nechyba  (forthcoming),  the  complex  interactions  between  un-
derlying economic  inequalities,  household  mobility, housing  markets,  and  voting behavior
imply  that  policy  interventions,  aimed  for instance  at  school  finance,  are likely to  have
consequences that  are  far from obvious.
Whether  in response  to court  mandates  or simply  as a matter  of policy, state  govern-
ment  transfers  to local school authorities  have grown substantially  throughout  the postwar
period.  In  the  eyes of critics,  however,  state  government  involvement  in local  education
5has contributed  to an  increase  in bureaucratization,  the  possible capture  of education  bu-
reaucracies  by teacher's  unions,  and  perverse  performance  and  fiscal  incentives  for local
school authorities.  In a number  of states,  parents  are being given greater  freedom to choose
which public  schools their  children  attend.  Providing  vouchers  which  could be applied  to
the cost  of either  private  or public  schooling  would carry  this  type  of reform a step  fur-
ther.  Note  that  partial  or complete  privatization  of schools, which would constitute  a step
in the  direction  of greater  decentralization  in education  provision,  could be  accompanied
by generous  state  support  for vouchers,  which would  coinstitute  a step  in  the direction  of
greater  centralization  of education  finance.  This  illustrates  the  fact  that  education,  like
many public sector programs,  bundles together  different public sector functions, such as the
provision  of certain  goods and  services and  the attainment  of an equitable  distribution  of
income.  Some of these  functions,  such as redistribution,  may be best  suited to  higher-level
governments,  while  others,  such  as school  administration  or  curriculum  design,  may  be
best  left to  local authorities  or to the  private  sector.  The  bundling  of functions  in a single
program  may thus  give rise  to  tensions  between  fiscal centralization  and  decentralization
aind to complex interactions  between levels of government  in the form of intergovernmental
transfers.
III.  Fiscal  Federalism  in  LDCs  and  TransitionL Economies
While  much of the  controversy  in  the  US over  the  proper  roles  of different  levels of
government  has  revolved  around  issues of equity  and  allocative  efficiency, recent  trends
toward  fiscal decentralization  in many third-world  and  transition  economies  have focused
new  attention  on macroeconomic  stability.  When  Musgrave  (1959) identified  macroeco-
nomic  stabilization  as  one  of the  three  principal  branches  of the  public  household  (in
addition  to  the  allocative  and  distributive  branches),  many  economists  were  convinced
that  fiscal policy could play an important  and  perhaps  decisive role in managing  short-run
aggregate-demand  fluctuations  so as to  achieve both  price  stability  and  full employment.
From the  traditional  Keynesian  perspective,  the  conventional  wisdom  has  been  that  the
manipulation  of fiscal  policy  for short-run  demand-management  purposes  should  be  left
to  the central  government  rather  than  to local governments  (see, e.g., Oates  [1968]). This
conventional wisdom remains  relatively intact,  at least insofar as Keynesian views on short-
run  macroeconomic  policy survive  at  all.  Nevertheless,  new concern  has  arisen about  the
macroeconomic  effects of fiscal decentralization,  not because  of new views about  the effects
of local or provincial  government  fiscal policy on the  business  cycle but  rather  because  of
worries that  fiscal decentralization  may contribute  to  structural  deficits  and  fiscal imbal-
6ance.  Even in  the  absence  of moves toward  fiscal decentralization,  it  has proven  difficult
in many countries  to control  aggregate  public sector borrowing;  in turn., heavy public bor-
rowing has increased  the  pressure  on central  banks  to engage  in inflationary  finance.  The
question  is whether  fiscal decentralization  tends  to accentuate  or to mitigate  these sorts of
problems.  Where  traditions  of state/provincial  and  local government  fiscal responsibility
are weak, where  the institutions  of political  control  and  accountability  are immature,  and
where administrative  professionalism  and control  are poorly  developed,  there  may be a risk
that  lower-level governments  may abuse or mismanage their  borrowing authority,  leading to
aggregate  fiscal imbalance  with  accompanying  adverse macroeconomic  consequences  (Bird
et  al.  [1995a], Prud'homme  [1995], Tanzi  [1996]).  A discussion  of some important  LDCs
and  transition  economies  will illustrate  how fiscal federalism  issues  have become  entan-
gled in problems  of overall macroeconomic  policy management.  The  following paragraphs
outline  some of the  policy issues that  have arisen recently  in  several important  countries,
including  India,  Argentina,  Brazil,  China,  and  Russia.
India.  Beginning  in the  late  1980s, India  began  serious efforts  to  limit  the growth  of
government  debt.  The  central  government  has  made  substantial  progress  in  this  regard
but  there  are increasing  fiscal difficulties at  the  state  government  level  (The World Bank
[1995a]). India has an  established  federal system  and  highly elaborated  programs  of inter-
governmental  revenue sharing  and fiscal transfers.  Both  the Planning  Commission  and the
Finance  Commission  provide  extensive  grants  to  state  governments  in order  to  promote
development  and  fiscal equalization.  This  system  has  come  under  criticism  for creating
perverse and  conflicting  incentives for state  governments  and  for failing to promote  equity
objectives  (Rao  and  Agarwal  [1994], Murty  and  Nayak  [1994]). Of late,  state  government
borrowing from the central  government  has begun  to create serious fiscal stress:  for a num-
ber  of states,  the  cost  of debt  service now amounts  to  15% or more  of state  government
expenditures  (The  World  Bank  [1995a]).  In  part,  this  seems  to  be  the  consequence  of
increases  in the  interest  rates  at which  state  governments  are allowed to borrow  from the
central  government.  Although  these rates  are no doubt  still below the  level at  which state
governments  could borrow on external  markets,  they  have been  brought  closer to  market
rates,  reducing  the  implicit  central-government  subsidy  to  state  government  borrowing.
Like any reduction  in central  government  transfers  to states,  this  has the  immediate  effect
of reducing  the  central  government  deficit  while raising  deficits  at  the  state  level.  As  a
result,  state  governments  now face new pressures  to strengthen  their  revenues and  cut ex-
penditures.  One consequence  has been a push  toward  privatization  of public  enterprise  in
the  electricity,  water,  and  transportation  sectors.  a move which typically  allows these en-
7terprises  to restructure  employment  and other  aspects  of their  operations  more freely than
could occur  in  the  public  sector  and  which  also  allows them  to  raise  capital  more easily
from  market  sources.  It  also seems likely that  the  states  will introduce  value-added  taxes
in order  to  generate  additional  revenue,  a move which raises  issues  of tax  harmonization
and  coordination  rather  similar  to those  faced in the EU context  (Burgess et al.  [1995]).
Raising  the  interest  rates  charged  to  state  governments  should  reduce  the  incentives
for state  governments  to resort  to deficit financing and  may help to  facilitate  liberalization
of the  financial  sector  of the  economy generally.  Reductions  in the  explicit  and  implicit
subsidies  to  state  governments  may  also help  the  central  government  to  control  its  own
borrowing.  The  states  of India,  however, continue  to  face many  demands  for public  ex-
penditures  for economic development  and  poverty  reduction.  The  attempt  to  meet  these
demands was a principal  motivation  for the establishment  of the system  of grants  and loans
to  the  states  in  the  first  place.  While  many states  may be  able  to  strengthen  their  own-
source revenues, substantial  disparities  among the states  will persist.  Some states  may face
fiscal crises as they  attempt  to  undertake  expenditures  in excess of their  revenues, which
may  prompt  fiscal and  regulatory  interventions  by the  central  government;  other  states,
in  cutting  expenditures  (for example,  for basic  health  and  education),  may also produce
significant  political  pressures  for assistance  from  the  center.  In  such  circumstances,  the
question  arises as to  how intergovernmental  transfers  and  borrowing  arrangements  can be
structured  so as to provide states  with  "adequate"  fiscal resources without  weakening their
incentives for fiscal discipline?  A sufficiently high level of transfers  from the  center  to the
states  would obviate  any  need for state  borrowing,  but  this  might just  shift  fiscal imbal-
ances back to  the  center.  The resolution  of these and  related  issues are likely to occupy a
prominent  place  in  discussions  of overall macroeconomic  management,  development,  and
income distribution  in India  for some time  to come.
Latin  America
Macroeconomic  considerations  have also figured  prominently  in  discussions  of fiscal
federalism  in  several  countries  in  Latin  America.  A  number  of Latin  American  coun-
tries  have undergone  significant  recent changes in the structure  of intergovernmental  fiscal
relations  and  in  the  comparative  roles  of different  levels of government.  Broadly  speak-
ing,  one might  characterize  the region as a whole as moving toward  increased  reliance  on
lower-level governments  to  manage  public  expenditures;  in some cases, this  shift  has been
accompanied  by increases  in local government  revenue  capacity,  but  in other  cases the in-
creased spending  by lower-level governments  has been financed  mainly  by transfers  (either
8through  grants  or through  shared  taxes)  from  higher-level  governments.  The  experience
has  been  quite  varied,  as described  for instance  in a recent  report  of the  Inter-American
Development  Bank  (1994)  (hereafter  IADB)  which  discusses trends  and  pitfalls  in  fiscal
decentralization  in the region as a whole and  presents  case studies  of Argentina,  Colombia,
Chile, and  Peru.8
In Peru, for example, the constitution  of 1979 included provisions for the establishment
of regional  governments,  but  these  provisions  were only  implemented  by  1990, and  they
were reversed  by  a  constitutional  reform  in  1993.  By  contrast,  constitutional  reforms  in
Chile  which  were  meant  to  shift  fiscal responsibilities  to  lower-level governments  seem
actuially to  have had  a real  effect: central  government  spending  as a share  of total  public
spending  fell from  95%  in  1970 to  87%  in  1980,  while  the  expenditure  share  of local
government  rose from 5% to  13%. (It is noteworthy, however, that  increased  local spending
has  not  been  accompanied  by  a  corresponding  increase  in  own-source  revenue;  central
government  revenues  accounted  for  over 97% of all public-sector  revenues  both  in  1970
and  1980.)  Colombia  has  seen  a  more steady  growth  of local  fiscal responsibilities  over
time,  with  local  spending  rising  from  about  10% to  about  17% of total  public  spending
between  1980 and  1992 and  local  own-source  revenues  increasing  from  5.6% to  7.3% of
total  government  revenues.
Argentina.  In  the  case of Argentina,  problems  of fiscal federalism  are closely inter-
twined with the country's  problems of macroeconomic and monetary  stability.  Throughout
the  1980s the  central  government  resorted  to  deficit financing  of public  expenditures,  and
the central  bank,  in monetizing  these deficits, increased  inflationary  pressures  to extraordi-
nary  levels. Resolution  of the fiscal crisis of the central  government  and the  establishment
of effective controls on monetary  growth  have been  thus been critical  issues for recent  eco-
nomic policy in Argentina,  and indeed the  country  has made substantial  progress on these
problems  in the  1990s (The  World  Bank  [1993]).  In this  environment  of macroeconomic
instability,  there  has been a significant shift  of revenue  and  expenditures  to  the provincial
and  local  governments.  This  shift  resulted  in  part  from  reforms  in  the  late  1980s that
mandated  that  a large fractions  (over 50%) of the revenues from major  central  government
taxes be  passed  along to  the  provinces, while discretionary  grants  from  the  center  to  the
provinces were reduced.  In  1983, central  government  expenditures  accounted  for around
52% of total  government  spending,  but  by 1992 this  had  fallen to  about  43%; provincial
spending  rose  from  30%  to  37% of government  spending  and  local  spending  rose  from
5.4%/c  to 8.6% over the  same period  (IADB).  Own-source revenues for each level of govern-
9ment  remained  roughly  steady  over this  period,  thus  reflecting  a large  increase  in central
transfers  to  the provinces.
Improved  management  of Argentina's  fiscal and  monetary  crises  has  thus  coincided
with substantial  fiscal decentralization.  There  is concern,  however, that  transfers  to provin-
cial  governments  have grown  too  quickly  and  that  there  is insufficient  reliance  on  own-
source financing  to encourage  accountable  and  responsible  spending  at  the provincial  level
(The  World Bank  [19931).  In addition,  provincial  government  deficits  have been financed
in part  by provincial banks,  many of which have gone bankrupt.  The central  bank's  policy
of managing  these  banks  and  absorbing  their  losses provided  provincial  governments  with
a circuitous  mechanism  of inflationary  finance, weakening; incentives  for fiscal discipline at
the provincial level. Recent  reforms of the financial sector and of central  bank policymaking
are designed in part  to  avoid these pitfalls.  Argentina  presents  an interesting  example of a
country  where financial sector and  monetary  reform, central  government  fiscal adjustment,
and  the restructuring  of intergovernmental  fiscal relations  have been  closely interrelated.
Brazil.  Brazil  is another  country  where  problems  of deficit  finance  by  subnational
governments  have  come  to  the  fore  recently.  Brazil  is a  federation  in  which  both  state
and local governments  have traditionally  played an important  fiscal role.  Substantial  func-
tional  responsibilities  are assigned  to state  and  local governments  by a  1988 constitution,
which also provides  for fiscal transfers  from the  center  to the  state  and  local governments
(Prud'homme  [1989]).  A significant  fiscal role for lower-level governments  antedates  the
new constitution,  however:  state  and  local  government  own-revenues  have  typically  ac-
counted  for 40-50%  of total  government  revenue since the  late  1950s (Shah  [1991], Table
5), and a substantial  share of central government revenue has been transferred  to lower-level
governments  through  grant  and  revenue-sharing  programs  throughout  this  period.  Inter-
estingly, state  governments  in  Brazil  have utilized  a value-added  tax  as a major  source of
own-revenue; this  tax has yielded  revenues of about  5% of GDP in recent  years,  accounting
for around  one-fourth  to one-third  of total  tax revenue collected  in the country  as a whole.
The recent  evolution  of fiscal federalism  in Brazil  cannot  be  properly  assessed, how-
ever, without  taking  into account  the relationship  between  lower-level governments,  public
enterprise,  and  the banking  sector.  Like Argentina,  Brazil  has experienced  extraordinarily
high  rates  of inflation  in  the  recent  past.  Monthly  inflation  rates  above  10% were com-
monplace  during  1983-85,  fell significantly  during  1986, and then  returned  to double-digit
levels in  1987.  Since then,  inflation  has  frequently  exceecled 20% per  month  (The  World
Bank  [1994], Statistical  Appendix,  Table  1).  During  this  highly inflationary  period,  state
10governments  have  owned  major  commercial  banks,  and,  particularly  in  major  economic
centers  such as Sao Paulo  and  Rio de Janeiro,  the  states  have engaged  in deficit financing
while  relying  on  the  state-owned  banks  to  purchase  state  debt.  In  1991. state  govern-
ments  had  an  outstanding  debt  of about  $57 billion  US  (The  WVorld  Bank  [19943. Table
11), compared  for example  to  a total  external  debt  of roughly  $120 billion  US. The  to-
tal  indebtedness  of the  states  has  since roughly  doubled  to  around  $110 billion US  (The
World Bank  [1995d]). Rapid  increases in real interest  rates  have drastically  increased  the
burden  of debt  service,  and  some states  (e.g., Sao Paulo,  whose debt  accounts  for almost
half of all state  debt  in  Brazil)  have ceased paying  principal  and  interest  to  state-owned
banks.  These banks  are important  components  of the  financial sector  in Brazil., and  they
now face a financial  crisis since the debts  of state  governments  and  public  enterprises  are
their  principal  assets.  Indeed,  the fiscal status  of the state  governments  is more precarious
than  indicated  by  the  official debt  figures.  For example,  since state  public  expenditures
are dominated  by outlays  for payrolls,  public capital  expenditures  are at  correspondingly
low levels, which  is probably  indicative  of low or negative  net  public  capital  investment
in  infrastructure.  More  important,  as large  as the  current  wage bill  for public  employees
may  be,  the  states  have  relied  heavily  on  deferred  compensation  as  well, giving  rise  to
substantial  underfunding  of public  employee pensions.9
In order  to  forestall  a  general  financial  crisis,  the  central  bank  has  assumed  respon-
sibility  for  the  management  of some  major  banks.  The  central  bank,  and  the  central
government,  may thus  absorb  the  debts  incurred  by  the  state  governments.  This  is not
an attractive  policy option,  however, since fiscal discipline is seen as a key element  in the
effort to  help  the  central  bank  limit expansion  of the  monetary  base  and  thus  to  control
inflation.  It  would be  desirable,  on this  account,  for the  central  bank  or the  central  gov-
ernment  not  to bail  out  the  states  and  their  banks  either  by having  the central  bank  take
over  the  non-performing  loans  of the  state  banks  or by  having  the  central  government
raise its own deficit by making  special transfers  to the states  with  which they  could service
their  debt.  In any  case, a shift  of state  liabilities up to  central  authorities  undermines  the
incentives  for fiscal discipline  on the  part  of the  state  governments,  and  could encourage
further  explicit and  implicit  deficit finance at the state  level.  If the central  authorities  force
the  states  and  their  banks  into bankruptcy,  however,  a general  banking  crisis may ensue
and  the provision  of key public services in major  economic centers  may be disrupted.  The
Brazilian  situation  seems to  exemplify a breakdown  of fiscal incentives  and  constraints  in
the structure  of intergovernmental  fiscal relations,  arising  at  least  in part  from the  close
connections  between  lower-level governments  and  key financial  institutions  and  from the
11mismanagement  of monetary  and  fiscal policy  at  the  central  government  level  that  has
contributed  to  a  highly  inflationary  environment.  It  appears  that  the  de facto structure
of intergovernmental  fiscal relations  includes the  use of state  banks,  and their  relationship
to the central  bank  through  the financial regulatory  system,  to  shift  implicit  liabilities  for
state  deficits  to  the  central  bank,  a structure  that  distributes  resources  and  alters  incen-
tives in ways very  different  from the  de jure  structure  embodied  in established  programs
of intergovernmental  grants  and  revenue sharing.
China
China presents  a fascinating  case where overall economic reform, macroeconomic  and
monetary  policy, and  problems  of interregional  imbalance  interact  with  intergovernmental
fiscal relations.  One fundamental  aspect of Chinese economic reform has of course been the
reduction  of the  role of state  planning  and  control  in the  operation  of the  economy.  The
fiscal arrangements  that  evolved during  the Mao period  proved  to  be poorly  adapted  to a
more market-oriented  economic system,  however.  A series of reforms  involving changes in
tax bases, tax administration,  and the division of revenues between lower- and  higher-level
governments  has occurred  in the past  decade  (see, e.g., Bahl and  Wallich [1992] and Agar-
wala [1992]). Uneven  economic development  among regions  - the  consequence,  in part,  of
deliberate  policies  of selective economic liberalization,  such as the  establishment  of "Spe-
cial Economic  Zones"  along the southeast  coast - have given rise to increases  in economic
inequality  that  are problematic  in themselves  and that  are making  it increasingly  difficult
for China  to control  internal  population  movements  among regions and  between rural  and
urban  areas.  Indeed,  the  enforcement  of the  hukou  system  of household  registration  has
depended  on state  bureaucratic  control  of grain rations,  employment,  housing,  and health
care, controls which are eroding,  and  must,  it seems, continue'to  erode,  as market  reforms
continue  (Cheng  and  Selden [1994], Harrold  and  Lall  [1993]).
Regional  inequalities,  uneven  regional  development,  and  internal  population  move-
ments  all create  demands  for regionally-differentiated  public  service provision  and  redis-
tributive  transfers.  Since the  revenue  system  at  each  level of government  as well as the
structure  of intergovernmental  fiscal relations  has been  changing  rapidly,  it is easy to  see
how regions  might  press demands  for fiscal assistance  from the  central  government  which
the center would be both  poorly positioned  to meet and poorly positioned  to resist.  Indeed,
the central  government  has relied in substantial  part  on]  lower-level governments  to collect
taxes  and to  transfer  resources  to it while at the same t;ime it attempts  to distribute  funds
to lower-level governments  to promote  central government  investment  and  other programs.
12Under  these conditions,  it has been difficult for the center  to limit  transfers  to lower-level
governments  while simultaneously  meeting  its  policy  objectives.  The  weak revenue  base
of the  center  has  created  pressures  on the  People's  Bank  of China  (PBC)  to  offer credit
to lower-level governments  which can be used to finance expenditures  in areas deemed  im-
portant  to  the  central  government.  Such  "policy lending,"  however, can prevent  the  PBC
frorn controlling  monetary  aggregates  in a way that  achieves overall macroeconomic  price
stability  (Lall  and  Hofman  [19951,  The  World  Bank  [1995b], Ma  [1995]).  Establishing  a
stru.cture  of tax  sharing  and  intergovernmental  fiscal transfers  between  different  levels of
government  is thus  a  complex  problem  (Laffont  [1995]) but  one  that  appears  to  be  quite
important  for macroeconomic  stability.
The  Former Soviet  Union and Eastern  Europe
China  is certainly  not  the only country  which is undergoing  a transition  away from a
socialist  system  and  simultaneously  reforming  its fiscal structure,  including  the assignment
of expenditure  responsibilities  and  revenue instruments  to  different  levels of government.
The  former Warsaw  Pact  countries  of eastern  Europe  and  the states  of the  former Soviet
Union  are  currently  grappling  with  these  problems  as  well.  The  breakup  of the  Soviet
Union itself was perhaps  the most dramatic  and decisive step toward  fiscal decentralization,
though  it is not  often  characterized  as such;  one  practical  consequence  of the  dissolution
of the  Soviet Union,  however,  has  been  that  the  public  finances  of Ukraine,  Russia,  the
Baltic  Republics,  and  other  newly-independent  states  are  no  longer  part  of the  overall
Soviet system.' 0
Russia.  Since the  breakup  of the  Soviet  Union,  the  public  finances  of the  Russian
Federation  have  been  under  enormous  pressure  to  change.  Some  loss of fiscal  control
is  perhaps  to  be  expected  in  the  transition  from  a  centrally  planned  economy.  In  the
old  regime,  government  finances  were  intertwined  with  the  administration  of a  heavily
state-controlled  economy  with  distorted  prices,  extensive  regulation,  ill-defined  property
rights,  and  incomplete  markets.  The  central  elements  of economic reform  - privatization,
decontrol  of prices, establishment  of legal protection  of property  rights  and contracts,  and
deregulation  - must  inevitably  have major  fiscal consequences.  One important  aspect  of
fiscal change  in  Russia  has  been  a  drastic  contraction  in  both  public  expenditures  and
taxes;  by  one recent  estimate,  public  expenditures  at  all  levels of government  fell from
roughly 65% of GDP  in 1992 to about  45% in 1994, while revenues fell from about  45% of
GDP to around  35%.11 Of course, a clearer delineation  of public and private  responsibilities
is a  key element  of economic reform in Russia,  and  a substantial  reduction  in the  size of
13the public sector,  together  with  a refocusing  of public-sector  activities  on core government
functions,  is an  important  part  of the reform process.
In the  midst  of this  rapid  reduction  in overall spending  and  taxation,  the  assignment
of revenues  and  expenditure  functions  by level of government  and  the  structure  of inter-
governmental  fiscal relations  has also been changing rapidly.  Federal  government  revenues
and  expenditures  appear  to  have fallen substantially  while regional  government  revenues
and  spending  have  increased,  at  least  as a  share  of GDP.  Major  taxes  are  collected  by
regional  governments  and,  in principle,  specified shares  of these  taxes  are supposed  to  be
passed up to the central  government.  However, a number of regions have unilaterally  with-
held all or part  of the  taxes  collected  in their  territories.  The  administration  and  sharing
of taxes  between  the  center  and  many  of the  regions  are  managed  on  an  ad  hoc  basis,
with  negotiated  settlements  between  them  to  determine  their  respective  tax  shares  and
jurisdictions."2 Meanwhile,  the central  government  has  shed many  expenditure  functions,
leaving the regions  with  significant  new functional  responsibilities.
The  Russian  Federation  is  an  extremely  heterogeneous  country,  with  wide  spatial
disparities  in incomes,  resource  endowments,  and  social and  ethnic  characteristics.  These
disparities  suggest a potentially  important  role for central  government  transfers  to promote
more fiscal uniformity  in tax burdens  and public service provision  among the regions.  How-
ever, the limited  ability  of the  center  to  administer  and  collect  taxes  and  the  shifting  of
expenditure  responsibilities  to lower-level governments  may signal the evolution  of a looser
federation in which the role of the central government  in transferring  fiscal resources among
regions is very constrained  and in which the fiscal circumstances  of different regions would
therefore  reflect their  underlying  heterogeneity.  It  may not  be  easy,  even if it  is deemed
desirable,  for the  central  government  to  prevent  increased  regional  fiscal autonomy  and
political  decentralization.  Indeed,  several observers  (Bahl  and  Wallich [1995], McLure  et
al.  [1995]) have noted  that  the  unwillingness  of the  constituent  republics  to  share  fiscal
resources  with  the  center  played  a  major  role in  the  dissolution  of the  Soviet Union  it-
self.  This  process  (which,  incidentally,  is reminiscent  of the  fiscal problems  that  faced
the United  States  under  the  Articles  of Confederation),  could lead  to the  further  weaken-
ing of the  Russian  Federation.  It  is worth  noting  that  if this  should  occur,  problems  of
intergovernmental  fiscal relations  would not  then  disappear.  The  regions  of the  Russian
federation  would  undoubtedly  continue  to  interact  economically  through  trade,  capital
flows, migration,  and  spillovers from public and  environmental  goods.  In the  absence of a
strong central  authority,  these economic interactions,  and  the fiscal issues to which they in-
14evitably  give rise.  would have to be managed  -horizontally,"  that  is, through  coordination
(or competition)  among jurisdictions.
Fiscal Restructuring:  Issues  on the Horizon
Before concluding  this  overview of the  developing  and  transition  economies,  let  us
look briefly to  the prospects  for change in political  and  fiscal institutions  in the  future.
The  breakup  of Czechoslovakia  and  of Yugoslavia,  like the  dissolution  of the  Soviet
Union.  represent  cases where fiscal decentralization  has occurred  in an  extreme  form. that
is,  through  the  demise  of the  central  government.  Numerous  other  countries,  including
particularly  those  where  ethnic  and religious tensions  are high, may well follow the path  of
the  Soviet Union.  Czechoslovakia.  and  Yugoslavia.  Governmental  structures  in numerous
African  countries,  such  as  the  Sudan,  Somalia,  Rwanda,  Burundi,  and  Nigeria,  could
easily fragment  along ethnic  and regional lines, as indeed has already  happened  recently  in
Ethiopia.  Longstanding  ethnic  strife  in Sri Lanka  persists  and  has  led recently  proposals
for constitutional  reform  which would divest the  central  government  of considerable  fiscal
authority.  allowing greater  autonomy  for regional  governments  that  would serve the Tamil,
Sinhalese. and  other  ethnic  groups in the country.
l[f the  dissolution  of  existing  jurisdictional  structures  is  a  likely  prospect  in  many
countries,  there  are also important  cases where increased  economic and  fiscal integration
appears  to be on the  horizon.  On the Korean  peninsula,  the division of the country  at the
close of the  Korean  War has  been followed by nearly  a half-century  of divergent  political
and  economic development.  Growing economic disparities  between  the  north  and  south
and  uncertainty  about  the continuity  of political  institutions  in the  north  raise questions
about  the  durability  of the  status  quo.  The  possibility  exists  that  unification,  perhaps
sudden,  will present  Koreans  with fiscal challenges like those  that  arose so unexpectedly  in
Gerrmany. In North  America,  Canadian  fiscal policy has often co-evolved with  trends  in its
large trading  partner  to  the south.  The North  American  Free Trade  Agreement  brings the
United  States,  Canada,  and  Mexico into a more closely integrated  economic system  which
will increase the importance  of fiscal interactions  among these countries,  and the same may
be true of the Mercosur countries  of South America.  Immigration  policy and labor mobility
are often raise important  fiscal issues for jurisdictions  that  are economically integrated;  this
is certainly  true  for the  US in relation  to Latin  America  and  for Israel  in relation  to  the
nascent  Palestinian  authority  and  the  territories  occupied  by Israel  since the  1967 war.
In  South  Africa, constitutional  reforms  are redefining  the roles  of central,  provincial,  and
15local  governments  in  ways which  should  facilitate  greater  economic,  political,  and  social
integration  of that  country's  several  racial  and  ethnic  populations,  presenting  substantial
challenges for fiscal policy, as discussed  by Ahmad  (forthcoming).
The  course  that  political  developments  will take  in  these and  other  countries  is im-
possible to  foresee.  Continued  change  in political  structures  can  be anticipated,  however,
suggesting  that  fiscal issues like those  that  have been discussed  above will be of recurring
interest  for some time  to come.
IV.  Conclusion
The  discussion  in  this  paper  has  provided  a sample  of some  of the  important  issues
of fiscal federalism  in a number  of important  countries  and regions  of the world, including
the EU, Canada,  the  US, India,  China,  Russia,  Argentina,  and  Brazil.  The  economic and
demographic  importance  of these cases, and  of others  that  could well have been discussed,
is obvious.  Particularly  in a  world  where  the  basic political  organization  of the  state  is
undergoing  rapid  reform  and  restructuring,  the tensions  and  opportunities  created  by the
fiscal interactions  among  governments  at all levels are of critical  concern.  The  adaptation
and  effective development  of fiscal institutions,  including  the  organization  of intergovern-
mental  fiscal relations  at  all  levels,  is  an  ongoing  and  evolutionary  process,  one  which
requires continuing  study  and  analysis.
Political,  social, legal, and economic conditions  are generally important  for the analysis
of fiscal issues, but  this  is perhaps  especially the case for the analysis of fiscal decentraliza-
tion, the fiscal interactions  among governments,  and other issues of fiscal federalism.  These
conditions  vary widely throughout  the world, however, which provides  both  opportunities
and difficulties for research  and policy analysis.  Much of the established  literature  of fiscal
federalism has been  explicitly  or implicitly  oriented  toward  the  institutions  and the policy
issues that  arise  within  developed  countries,  particularly  Canada  and  the  United  States.
These  countries  and  their  fiscal problems  are of interest  in  themselves  and  have provided
a context  within  which  many  important  principles  and  hypotheses  have been  developed
and  tested.  Making  due  allowance for  the  differing  circumstances  of other  regions  and
countries,  application  of the  findings  of this  literature  can contribute  a  great  deal to  the
understanding  of related  issues throughout  the world.  At the same uime, wide institutional
variations  mean  that  rather  different  policy  problems  are likely to  arise  in  differing set-
tings,  requiring  shifts  of emphasis in analysis  and research,  and  opening up new topics for
investigation.  The  preceding  discussion suggests  several  topics for research  that  have not
16received as much attention  in the past  as they seem to warrant.
One topic that  deserves further  attention,  especially in the context  of developing  and
transition  economies,  is the  interplay  between  intergovernmental  grants  and  government
borrowing.  Debt  policy  creates  a wedge between  a government's  (primary)  expenditures
ancd  its  (primary)  revenues.  Intergovernmental  grants  do the same:  recipient  governments,
like governments  that  borrow,  can spend  more than  they collect  in revenue,  while the pri-
mary  expenditures  of donor  governments  are reduced  relative  to  their  revenue.  In  many
countries,  lower-level governments  receive transfers  from  those  at  higher  levels,  and  the
higher-level  governments  engage  in borrowing.  How is this  different  from  allowing lower-
level governments  to  borrow  directly,  bypassing  the  intermediary  of  the  central  govern-
ment?  Do fiscal interdependencies  between  central  and  lower-level governments,  reflected
in intergovernmental  transfer  programs,  imply that  lower-level government  borrowing  cre-
ates implicit  liabilities on the part  of central governments?  If so, must  central governments
impose controls  on lower-level borrowing,  or is it  possible  to  structure  intergovernmental
fiscal relations  in  such  a way as to  allow local  borrowing  without  inducing  adverse local
incentives?  In the  absence of independent  local access to  capital  markets,  should  one view
the  central  government  as  a  financial  intermediary  or  delegated  borrower  acting  on be-
half of local  governments,  obtaining  funds  through  the  issuance  of debt  that  can then  be
transferred  to  lower-level governments  through  intergovernmental  grants?  What  are the
advantages  or disadvantages  of this  sort of intermediation?
A related  question  for research  concerns the  issue of  "hard"  and  "soft"  budget  con-
straints  for  lower-level  governments.  In  China,  Russia,  Brazil,  and  elsewhere,  central
government  monetary  and  fiscal authorities  seem to  absorb  fiscal imbalances  incurred  by
lower-level governments.  Why do these countries  settle  their intergovernmental  fiscal trans-
actions  on an ad  hoc basis, responding  to the  fiscal distress  of lower-level units  with  a va-
riety of special loans,  grants,  negotiated  tax-sharing  agreements,  directed-credit  programs,
and. other  "emergency"  bailouts,  rather  than  establishing  firm and  transparent  rules which
would govern the form and  extent  of fiscal flows between central  and subnational  fiscal and
financial institutions?  It  is likely that  the unsystematic  and  "flexible" arrangements  found
in aL  number  of countries  do not  provide effective incentives for lower-level governments  to
manage  their  expenditure,  tax,  and  other  fiscal decisions efficiently or responsibly.  Many
observers have argued  that  it is desirable  to establish  "hard"  budget  constraints  for lower-
level fiscal authorities,  which may well be sound  normative  advice.  What  exactly  are the
economic distortions  associated  with  "soft"  budget  constraints,  however?  What  sorts  of
17institutional  reforms  might  help  to  establish  hard  budget  constraints?  A more  detailed
institutional  comparison  of  different  countries  might  shed  light  on  these  questions.  In
addition,  formal  modelling  is needed  clarify  the  nature  of the  incentives  associated  with
different  institutional  structures  and  thus  to  shed  light  on  types  of institutional  change
that  might  facilitate  more effective organization  of decentralized  fiscal systems.
The  formation  or  dissolution  of countries  is a  topic  about  which  modern  economics
has  not  had  much  to  say  (but  see  Austin  (1996),  Berkowitz  [forthcoming],  Burbidge  et
al.  [1994], Casella  [1994], Shapiro  and  Petchey  [1994]).  Perhaps  because  of the  rigid
polarization  of the  Cold  War  and  the  high  potential  costs  of superpower  confrontation,
national  boundaries  in much of the world, especially  the developed  world,  have been rela-
tively stable  during  the past  half-century.  In historical  terms,  however, such stability  may
be  anomalous.  Changes  in jurisdictional  structure  may  be  part  of the  normal  course  of
economic events to  which  we ought  to  become  accustomed.  In any  case, the  existence of
national  units  within  established  boundaries  is now called into question  with  increased and
sometimes  unsettling  frequency,  and  one  must  similarly  question  whether  the  "country"
remains  the  appropriate  unit  of analysis  for at  least  sonme  important  issues in economics.
What  are  the  fundamental  economic  forces that  shape  "natural"  economic  areas?  Are
there significant economic benefits or costs that  result from the inclusion of several regions
within  one jurisdictional  structure?  From  a normative  viewpoint,  what  are the  economic
considerations  that  determine  the  optimal  size of a  "country,"  and  what  are  the  crucial
economic functions  of "national"  governments?  From a positive  viewpoint,  to what  extent
do economic forces drive the  political  restructuring  that  we observe,  and  where may these
forces take  us in the future?
Gains  from economic  association  through  trade  in  goods  and  services  and  from  free
movement  of factors  of  production  are  certainly  crucial  elements  of  this  story.  Demo-
graphic  change,  changes in  the technology  of communication  and  transportation,  and  the
development  of market  institutions  may  alter  the  optimal  or  equilibrium  boundaries  of
political  units  over  time.  Such change  invariably  raises  questions  about  the  organization
of the public  sector  and  the assignment  of expenditures  and  revenues  to different levels of
government.  The integration  of labor  and  capital  markets,  for example,  can be promoted
by political  union  among  governments  or through  policies such  as deregulation  of capital
markets  or  relaxation  of immigration  controls.  Such  integration  must  certainly  provide
greater  opportunities  for the efficient deployment  of factors  of production  over space and
among  industries,  but,  by  affecting  factor  markets,  it  also  affects  the  distribution  of in-
18come. Perhaps  the distributional  effects of factor market  integration  would create a greater
role for government  redistributive  policies,  for example  by cushioning  some  factors  from
negative quasi-rents.  Yet. as mentioned already  in Section II, the opening of factor markets
may limit  the ability  of governments  to  undertake  redistributive  policies.  Conversely, the
erection  of barriers  to factor  movements  through  political  separation  may entail efficiency
losses while facilitating  government  policy interventions.  The  patterns  of gains and  losses
resulting  from  the  reorganization  of jurisdictional  structures  can  thus  be  quite  complex.
To understand  them  fully requires  an  appreciation  both  of the  economic consequences  of
changes  in  market  organization  and  of the  economic  consequences  of changes  in  policy
outcomes  resulting  from  the  reorganization  of the  public  sector.  This  raises  a  series  of
questions  that  cuts  across  many  areas  of economics,  including  labor  economics,  finance,
urban  and regional  economics,  and international  economics in addition  to public economics
and  political  economy.
19FOOTNOTES,
t  I am  grateful  to  numerous  colleagues  for comments  on  this  paper  and  for general
discussions of the topics  discussed here.  These  include R. Bird  and  many World Bank  col-
leagues, especially J.  Ahmad,  H. Davoodi,  S. Devarajan,  G. Eskeland,  D. Sewell, P. Vieira
da  Cunha,  and  H.-F.  Zou.  Talking  with  them  about  fiscal federalism  issues throughout
the  world has  been  enormously  instructive  and  has  greatly  reduced  the  formidable  bar-
riers  involved in  trying  to  understand  the  diverse  and  often  complicated  fiscal problems
encountered  in  countries  undergoing  rapid  economic and  political  change.  None of these
individuals,  however,  can be held accountable  for any  errors,  omissions,  or lapses  of judg-
ment.  This paper  was written  while the author  was visiting  the Public Economics  Division
of the Policy Research  Department  of the World Bank,  whose hospitality  is greatly  appre-
ciated.
' See Bird (1994) for insightful discussion of the benefits and limitations  of comparative
analyses  of federal  finance;  also see McLure  et  a].  (1995) provide  a  concise comparative
survey of intergovernmental  fiscal relations  and  Shah (1994) for a general discussion of fiscal
federalism issues in developing  countries.  The following discussion  is intended  to  illustrate
some of the diversity  of issues relating  to fiscal federalism  and  fiscal decentralization  that
arise in many parts  of the  world today  and  to provide  references  to  some  (though  only  a
portion)  of the relevant  literature  for interested  readers.
2  For discussion  of these  issues, see, e.g., Wildasin  (1¶191,  1992, 1994, forthcoming,  a,
b), Wellisch and Wildasin  (1996), and, for surveys and many additional  references,  Cremer
et al. [1995]) and  Wildasin  (forthcoming,  c).
3  A number  of the  fiscal issues that  arise in another  mature  federation,  Australia,  are
discussed by Petchey  and  Shapiro  (forthcoming).
'  See, e.g.,  Courchene  (1984), Boadway  and  Hobson  (1993), Shah  (1995), and  refer-
ences therein.
5 See the contributions  to Boadway  et al.  (1991) and  B3anting et al.  (1994) for further
discussion.
6  Revelation  of preferences  through  locational  choices offers the  prospect  that  more
efficient levels of public  good provision  can be achieved than  otherwise  would be the case,
a possibility  identified  by Tiebout  (1956) in an influential  article.
207 It  has  proven  very  difficult to  determine  exactly  what  variables  under  the  control
of policymakers  are  able  to  influence  educational  outcomes;  in  particular,  per-student
educational  expenditures  do not  seem to  have the  decisive impact  on educational  output
that  one might anticipate  (see, e.g., Hanushek  41986]). This  greatly  complicates  the school
finance debate  since the  true  nature  of any efficiency/equity  tradeoffs  remains  obscure.
8  See also Campbell  et al.  (1991), Winkler  (1994), and  The  World Bank  (1996a) for
further  discussion  of the  experience  of fiscal federalism  in Latin  America.
9 Under  proper  deficit  accounting,  changes in  the  real  value of public  infrastructure
assets  and  in  implicit  or  contingent  liabilities  such  as  underfunded  pensions  should  be
included  in  a comprehensive  measure  of the  change  in public  sector  net  worth  (see, e.g.,
Eisner  [1986], Kotlikoff  [1992], Boadway  and  Wildasin  [1989], and  references  therein).
This  type  of accounting  is seldom undertaken,  however,  which  can  give rise  to  perverse
incentives.  The  underfunding  of municipal  employee pensions  in  the  US  is a problem  of
long standing;  see, e.g., Inman  (1980, 1981) and  Epple  and  Schipper  (1981).
10 See Bird  et  al.  (1995b)  for discussions  of fiscal decentralization  and  intergovern-
mental  fiscal relations  in  Hungary,  Poland,  Bulgaria,  Romania,  Albania,  and  Ukraine,  in
a(idition  to  the  Russian  federation.  Problems  of local government  finance  in Estonia  are
discussed  in The World  Bank  (1995c).  See also Bahl  (1995) for comparative  discussion  of
China,  Russia,  and  the US.
"1  The  World Bank  (1996b), Tables  A.1-A.3.  This  shrinkage  in the  size of the public
sector in relation  to GDP  is all the more remarkable  in view of the fact that  GDP itself has
fallen by about  40% during  the same period  (The World Bank  (1996c), Table  A3. It must
be noted  that  fiscal and  other statistical  reporting  in Russia is incomplete  and accounting
methods  are unstable.  Large  errors  must  therefore  be  expected  in  fiscal  accounts,  and
figures are unlikely  to be  properly  comparable  over time.
12  See,  e.g.,  Bahl  and  Wallich  (1995),  McLure  et  al.  (1995),  and  The  World  Bank
(1996b),  p.  17, and  The  World Bank  (1996c), pp.  44-46.  Some  (though  not  all) of these
negotiated  settlements  involve resource-rich  regions  and  the  sharing  of the  rents  accruing
to resource-intensive  industries.
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